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Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting
Remedies for Employment Discrimination*
Bernard D. Meltzert
Labor arbitrators and other tribunals face serious problems of co-
ordination as the result of overlap, as well as conflict, between arbitra-
tion systems and a broad array of public regulation. Overlap and con-
flict have increased as both collective agreements and the regulation
that governs them have become more complex and detailed.
Remedies in some areas, such as employment discrimination on
account of race or sex, run like water.1 If employment discrimination
occurred in an enterprise under contract with the federal government,
a remedy might be provided by the National Labor Relations Board,
state courts, federal courts, state and municipal fair employment agen-
cies, or the Department of Labor. Remedies might be based not only
on the statutes and executive orders that these forums call to mind but
also on the Civil Rights Act of 1866,2 the Fair Labor Standards Act as
amended in 1963,3 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967,4 the Constitution, and ancient equitable doctrines making repre-
sentative powers powers in trust.5 Furthermore, standards embodied in
* This paper was the basis for a talk delivered on October 15, 1971 at the Conference
on Arbitration, held in Buffalo, New York under the auspices of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, the American Arbitration Association, and the Industrial Rela-
tions Research Association for Western New York. The author expresses indebtedness to
his colleague, Prof. Owen M. Fiss, for helpful suggestions.
t James Parker Hall Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 See generally Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Compara-
tive Evaluation of Forums, 46 WAsn. L. REv. 455 (1971).
2 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
3 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
5 Although the duty of fair representation is typically derived solely from statutory
provisions for majority rule and exclusive representation, general equitable or tort prin-
ciples would appear to warrant the imposition of such a duty on any union that purports
to represent employees regardless of whether the union enjoys statutory protection. Cf. A.
Bmua, STUDIES IN TnE LAw oF CoRPoRATE FINANcE 46, 63 (1928).
Another possible, if specialized, remedy is suggested by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission's petition to the Federal Communications Commission to consider
the allegedly discriminatory employment practices of American Telegraph and Telephone
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or read into collective agreements and enforced through the grievance-
arbitration process might provide an additional remedy.
Initially, Congress and other organs of government were preoccupied
with creating remedies for a deep-seated affliction of our society and
largely ignored the coordination of remedies. The problem of co-
ordination could not, however, be avoided for long. As the remedial
machinery was invoked, inescapable friction among its overlapping
parts heightened concern with the question of how public remedies
were to be coordinated with each other and how each of those remedies
was to be integrated with the arbitration system. I propose to concen-
trate on one aspect of the latter question-that is, the interaction of
arbitration and the remedies provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Acts of 19646-and to deal with four interdependent questions raised
by such interaction:
First, how should arbitrators handle Title VII issues that overlap
with issues concerning the interpretation or application of a collective
bargaining agreement?
Second, when such overlap exists, under what circumstances, if any,
should an arbitral determination--or a settlement in the grievance
process without arbitration-bar an employee from invoking his or
her Title VII remedy?
Third, when a Title VII remedy overlaps a remedy under a collective
agreement, under what circumstances, if any, should an individual
claimant be required to exhaust the grievance-arbitration procedure?
Fourth, what effect should initial recourse either to arbitration or
to contractual remedies have on pertinent limitation periods?
I
In dealing with grievances that implicate statutory as well as con-
tractual provisions,7 we should distinguish between two situations. In
Corporation in connection with: the latter's request for a rate increase. See Developments
in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1241 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Some of the
grounds on which that petition rests would be equally applicable to a broad range of
federal and state rate-making proceedings.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15.
7 My discussion of such grievances will summarize my more generalized presentation at
the 1967 meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators. See Meltzer, Ruminations About
Ideology, Law, and Arbitration, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 545 (1967), in THE ARBrrMATOR, THEt
NLRB, ANm TE CouRTs: PRoCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
AcADEMy OF ARBrrAToRs 1, 14-19 (D. Jones ed. 1967). For a response and a rejoinder,
compare Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in DE oPmrs iN AnmmucN AND
FoRErGN ARBnRATION: PROCF.E INGs OF THE TwENTY-Fnlsr ANNUAL MEEIG; NATIONAL
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the first situation, the contractual and statutory standards are not in
conflict but overlap, so that a question of fact or interpretation is com-
mon to both the statutory and contractual claims. In the second, there
is an unavoidable conflict between the contract and the statute, so that
the arbitrator must, in effect, repudiate the contract in order to enforce
the statute.
The first situation would arise if, for example, an agreement barred
discrimination in employment on grounds of race and a grievance
protested that failure to promote a Negro violated the contractual pro-
vision. Everyone seems to agree that an arbitrator in resolving that
question should, or at least could, properly take account of the policy
of and decisions under Title VII.8 In such a situation, there is no neces-
sary incompatibility between the contractual and statutory standards.
Furthermore, the parties formulated the contractual standard loosely,
presumably for the purpose of permitting consideration of all relevant
factors, including relevant public regulation. In considering such
regulation, an arbitrator is not adding to or derogating from the agree-
ment but is carrying out his classic role as interpreter and monitor of
the bargain.9 Similarly, where a contractual standard is susceptible to
two interpretations, one compatible with, and the other repugnant to,
an applicable statute, the statute is a relevant factor for interpretation.
Arbitral interpretation of agreements, like judicial or administrative
interpretation of statutes, should seek to avoid a construction that
would be invalid under a higher law.
Let us turn now to the second situation, involving a conflict between
the agreement and the statute, and assume the following case: The
parties by their agreement have provided that certain aptitude tests
may be used in determining who shall be promoted. The designated
tests are, however, contrary to guidelines adopted by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission or to court decisions. A Negro
ACADEMY OF ARBITRAToRS 42 (C. Rehmus ed. 1968), with Meltzer, The Role of Law in
Arbitration: A Rejoinder, in id. at 58. See also Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow
Federal Law?, in ARBrrPATiON AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-THiRD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEmy OF ARBITRATORS 29 (G. Somers &
B. Dennis eds. 1970). This question has also been discussed in Platt, The Relation Between
Arbitration and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REv. 398 (1968).
8 See, e.g., Mittenthal, supra note 7, at 42-43.
9 See Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HALv. L. Rv. 999,
1016 (1955): "A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are obliged to
accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a community which transcends
the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-government created by and confined to
the parties. He serves their pleasure only, to administer the rule of law established by their
collective agreement."
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employee denied a promotion because of low test scores files a grievance
under the agreement, which restricts the arbitrator's authority to the
interpretation or administration of the agreement and directs him not
to add or detract from it. I have suggested, and most arbitrators appear
to agree,' 0 that in such a situation the arbitrator should respect the
agreement and ignore the law. There is no reason to credit arbitrators
as a class with any special competence with respect to the law." Fur-
thermore, if the arbitrator selected by the parties invoked the law to
defeat their agreement, he would be going beyond the authority con-
ferred by the submission agreement. He would also be moving into
areas in which courts or other official tribunals, and not arbitrators,
have been granted plenary authority. The extremely limited judicial
review and the substantial finality applicable to awards enforcing the
contract are based on assumptions concerning the special institutional
competence of arbitrators to treat contractual issues and the parties'
consent to such treatment.12 Such competence or consent cannot, how-
ever, be properly assumed with respect to awards enforcing the law and
abrogating the contract. Indeed, such awards would be vulnerable to
10 See Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under
Title VII, 69 MIcH. L. Rxv. 599, 645 n.25 (1971).
11 Dean Sovern has suggested that there is an inconsistency in my saying that arbi-
trators are competent to take account of statutory provisions in resolving contractual
ambiguities and in my also saying that arbitrators, absent special authorization from the
parties, are not competent to declare contractual provisions invalid as repugnant to statu-
tory provisions. Sovern, supra note 6, at 34. Although his suggestion is plausible, it ignores,
I believe, several important considerations. When parties adopt elastic contractual stan-
dards, the conclusion that the parties "intended" an arbitrator, in interpreting or applying
such standards, to consider relevant statutory or social considerations seems justified. This
consideration may, of course, impose substantial burdens on a particular arbitrator, but
such burdens are an inescapable incident of the arbitrator's obligation to enforce the
contract. Accordingly, such burdens are within an arbitrator's institutional competence
even though they may strain his personal competence. It is true that "institutional com-
petence" may be challenged as a question-begging phrase. But classic statements of the
arbitrator's role, such as Shulman's (note 9 supra), affect the parties' expectations and
would warrant a distinction between the use of law as an element of interpretation and
its use as a basis for invalidating unambiguous contractual standards. Such a distinction
would, moreover, reduce the number of situations in which the personal competence of
an arbitrator would be strained.
12 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior c Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960),
in which Justice Douglas stated: "The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the
parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in
his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the
contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment of a particular
grievance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective bar-
gaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular
result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be
heightened or diminished."
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attack on the basis of the celebrated dictum in United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.:13 "[The award] may be read as based
solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legis-
lation, which would mean that he exceeded the scope of the sub-
mission."
Some discussions regarding the role of law in arbitration invite a
word of clarification with respect to the sense in which I have just
referred to the "competence of arbitrators."' 4 What I have in mind is
"institutional" rather than "personal" competence, and I base my con-
clusion about institutional competence on the underlying purpose of
arbitration as a vehicle of protest against departures from the bargain,
on the predominantly consensual nature of arbitration,15 on the fact
that many arbitrators lack legal training, and on the presuppositions
underlying the generally limited judicial review of arbitral awards-
namely, that the arbitrator's expertise and the parties' consent extend
only to arbitral treatment of contractual issues. These institutional con-
siderations should, I believe, be respected even though a particular
arbitrator happens to be, or happens to think that he is, qualified to
deal with the law that appears to invalidate a contractual provision.
Even though John Kenneih Galbraith has just reminded us again that
modesty is an overrated virtue, vanity, or self-evaluation, even when or
especially when coupled with the itch to do good, is a doubtful basis
for jurisdiction. 16 Furthermore, the fact that what are often the acci-
'3 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
14 -See Mittenthal, supra note 7, at 48; Sovern, supra note 7, at 34-35, 38.
35 It is true that in John Wiley & Sons v. Livington, 376 US. 543, 549-50 (1960), labor
policy as well as consensus was held to affect issues cognizable in arbitration. See Sovern,
supra note 7, at 86-37. Nevertheless, quite apart from the difficulties associated with
Wiley and its progeny, voluntarism persists as a fundamental ingredient of our labor
relations system. When the law provides an independent remedy for a particular evil,
there is, I believe, no adequate justification for an arbitrator's dilution of voluntarism
on the basis of his determination that he is qualified to apply the law. But see Sovern,
supra ndte 7, at 38j 40; cf. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-04, 108 (1970);
Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. NLRB, 77 L.R.R.M. 2081 (2d Cir. 1971). Since, as is
suggested in note 17 infra, judicial deference to arbitral determination of legal issues
would be inappropriate, the benefits from such arbitral determination do not seem to
warrant the costs involved. Cf. Aksen, Arbitration and Antitrust-Are They Compatible?,
44- N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1097; Lovinger, Antitrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1085, 1094; Pitosky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U.L. R-v. 1073,
1076 (1969).
16 But see Note, 32 Omo ST, L.J. 395, 405-06 (1971), which reports that a large per-
centage of the members of the National Academy of Arbitrators, responding to a ques-
tionnaire, affirmed their own competence to deal with legal questions. The note con-
dudes that arbitrators should deal with such questions. Regrettably, the student editors
did not deal with the possibility that failure to reply was correlated with lack of knowl-
edge; nor did they show any sklepticism with respect to self-serving responses.
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dents of the selection process turn up an arbitrator qualified to apply
the pertinent law does not mean that the parties have authorized him
to nullify their agreement by recourse to statutory standards. Surely,
if the parties wish to confer such authority, unambiguous language for
doing so is readily at hand before the arbitration hearing or after it
has begun.
When an arbitrator, despite the lack of such authorization, relies
on the law to defeat the collective agreement, he may create other
difficulties, which have generally been overlooked. Under such circum-
stances, it is likely that the legal issues were not considered in the
grievance process and that one or both of the parties' representatives
would not be qualified to deal with them during the arbitration hear-
ing.17 In the latter event, the arbitrator might be confronted with un-
comfortable alternatives. He could rely on an inadequate presentation
of the legal issues during the hearing, or he could go beyond such a
presentation and thereby defeat the normal expectation that his award
is to be based on the evidence and considerations developed during the
arbitration hearing. Although this dilemma might be resolved, wholly
or partially, by procedural expedients, such as continuances and post-
hearing statements, resort to such devices would both reshape the
parties' submission and increase the already considerable delays of
arbitration.
II
Even if arbitrators give the law the limited role I have suggested
above, they will sometimes resolve issues that would be plainly cog-
nizable under Title VII, arbitration aside. Such resolutions give rise
to our second question: Under what circumstances, if any, should an
arbitral award foreclose an employee from invoking his or her Title
VII remedy? Although various circuits have made pronouncements
that may be read as negating such foreclosure, 8 it appears that the
17 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aft'd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971),
discussed in text at notes 25-29 infra, seems to illustrate this situation. The union was
not represented by an attorney in the arbitration.
18 See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (1969); Hutchings v.
United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311-14 (5th Cir. 1970). It should be noted that
the court in Hutchings left for the future the question whether courts dealing with
Title VII might follow the NLRB practice of deferring to arbitration when certain
standards are met. Id. at 314 & n.10. Furthermore, in Bowe, the Seventh Circuit declared
generally that the analogy to concurrent NLRB and arbitral jurisdiction was "controlling"
in holding that a grievant was not required to elect between statutory and contractual
remedies prior to a decision on the merits in any forum. 416 F.2d at 714. If after an
arbitration award had been rendered the NLRB practice were "conclusive" for Title VII,
courts under some circumstances would defer to such awards. See text and note at note 52.
1971]'
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Sixth Circuit is the only federal court of appeals that has ruled squarely
on that matter. Its position, first announced in Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co.,19 was that an arbitral denial of a claim of employment dis-
crimination barred the claimant from pursuing his Title VII remedies.
The decision in Dewey was affirmed last term by an equally divided
Supreme Court.20 It should be noted that the Sixth Circuit, although
holding that the arbitral determination barred judicial consideration
of the merits of the alleged statutory violation, also concluded that no
violation of Title VII had occurred. Consequently, there is doubt
whether any or all of the four Justices of the Supreme Court who voted
for affirmance accepted the Sixth Circuit's views with respect to arbitral
foreclosure of statutory remedies. The fact that no other circuit has ex-
pressly adopted foreclosure, coupled with the ambiguity of the Supreme
Court's decision, invites a closer look at the Sixth Circuit's disposition
of the Dewey case.
Dewey had worked in a Reynolds Metals plant in Michigan for fifteen
years before his discharge in 1966 for violating the company's policy
with respect to compulsory overtime. Beginning in 1960, collective
agreements with the United Auto Workers, to which Dewey belonged,
provided that all employees were obligated to perform all straight time
and overtime work required of them by the company in the absence of
"a substantial and justifiable reason for not working." In September,
1965, apparently after the union had expressed some concern about
compulsory overtime, the company issued an interpretation of the
agreement allowing an employee to be relieved of an overtime assign-
ment by arranging for a qualified employee to replace him. Dewey, a
member of the Faith Reformed Church since 1961, first refused to carry
out a Sunday overtime assignment on November 21, 1965, basing his
refusal on his religious beliefs. He received a warning. During the next
nine months, another qualified employee replaced Dewey whenever the
latter was scheduled for Sunday overtime. But subsequently Dewey
called off his replacement and stated that securing a replacement contra-
vened his religious convictions, which were conceded to be sincere.
Subsequent refusals by Dewey to work on Sundays or to secure a quali-
fied replacement led to his discharge.
Dewey thereupon took ample advantage of the remedial arsenal. He
filed a grievance under the collective agreement and simultaneously
filed a charge with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. The Com-
mission ruled against him, and he turned to the United States Office of
Federal Contract Compliance, which also rebuffed him. But in January,
19 429 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 US. 689 (1971).
20 402 US. 689 (1971).
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1967, the EEOC rewarded his persistence, overruling its regional direc-
tor, finding probable cause, and authorizing Dewey to sue in a federal
district court.
Before Dewey filed suit, Mark Kahn, a respected economist-arbitrator,
denied his grievance in an award dated June 29, 1967. At the arbitration
proceeding, Dewey had been represented by a union official, but not by
an attorney, although the company had been so represented; and the
company, but not the union, had filed a posthearing brief.21 The col-
lective agreement did not contain a provision barring religious discrim-
ination, but it did contain a provision denying the arbitrator authority
to add to, detract from, or modify the agreement.
Mr. Kahn's denial of the grievance rested on two basic findings. First,
the "substantial and justifiable reason" for not performing overtime
assignments, although it justified an occasional refusal to work over-
time, did not warrant a refusal to do all Sunday work.22 Second, the
contract required Dewey to "utilize the established replacement proce-
dure in order to minimize or perhaps avoid entirely the need to con-
front the company with a refusal of Sunday work."23 The arbitrator's
opinion said nothing about the statute-either as a source of extra
contractual rights or as a guide to interpreting the plastic contractual
phrase "substantial and justifiable reason. ' 24 The company's brief had
also been silent about those matters.
The district court first held that the adverse arbitral determination
did not foreclose Dewey from pursuing his remedy under Title V11 25
and subsequently sustained Dewey's claim on the merits,2( relying on
Sherbert v. Verner,2 7 on the absence of proof that Dewey's refusal to
work on Sundays would impose hardship on the company, and on the
EEOC guidelines,28 notwithstanding their issuance after the fact of the
discharge.29
21 291 F. Supp. 786, 789 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
22 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Local 227, UAW (unpublished award, June 29, 1967) (Kahn,
Arbitrator).
23 Id.
24 The district court approved the arbitrator's abstention from statutory issues. See 291
F. Supp. at 789. It should be recalled that the company's interpretation had been issued
after the passage of Title VII. That interpretation had, moreover, been the basis of
discipline and an arbitration award resting on the contract and plant practice. Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Local 227, UAW (unpublished award, June 29, 1967) (Kahn, Arbitrator).
Under those circumstances, the arbitrator's disregard of Title VII, even as a guide to
interpretation of vague contractual language, seems sound.
25 291 F. Supp. at 789.
28 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
27 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
28 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
"0) The Sixth Circuit said that application of the regulation which was in force at
1971]
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We shall leave to other forums the merits of the Title VII question
and focus on the Sixth Circuit's argument for reversing the procedural
determination, which went like this: First, the Steelworkers' Trilogy"0
would have barred the company from relitigating an arbitral award in
favor of Dewey.31 Second, when grievances are based on an alleged civil
rights violation, an arbitrator has a right to make a determination of
such a grievance binding on both parties. Otherwise, arbitration would
bind the employer but not the employee, and such one-sidedness would
-sound the death knell of labor arbitration.3 2
The court's approach, which has been uniformly criticized in the law
reviews,33 does not withstand analysis. First, the Steelworkers' Trilogy
accords finality to arbitral awards dealing with the law of the shop and
not the law of the land. Indeed, the celebrated dictum in Enterprise
Wheel, to which I have already referred,8 4 suggests that Mr. Kahn's
award, had it been based solely on Title VII and not on the contract,
would for that reason alone have been assailable as beyond his jurisdic-
tion. Such an award, if based on an erroneous view of the statute, would
also have been subject to judicial correction regardless of whether an
employer or an employee benefited from that error. As the Fifth Cir-
cuit put it in Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc.,"3 "Congress
... has made the federal judiciary, not the EEOC or the private arbitra-
tor, the final arbiter of an individual's Title VII grievance." The Sixth
Circuit's fears of one-sidedness in the context of the Dewey case are thus
wholly unfounded; they result from a failure to keep in mind the dis-
tinctive institutional competence of arbitrators, who are the monitors
of the bargain, and of courts, who guard the law. With respect to the
contractual determinations made by the arbitrator in Dewey, both
parties could have secured only the most limited judicial review. But
if the arbitrator had made any statutory determinations that did not
coalesce with contractual determinations, both parties could have had
the time of Dewey's discharge would have been "more appropriate." 429 F.2d at 329
(1970).
80 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 863 US. 574 (1960): United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
31 429 F.2d at 331-32.
82 Id. at 332.
38 E.g., Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 10, at 641-49 (1971); Gould, Labor Arbitration of
Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969); Hebert &
Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating Employment Discrimina-
tion, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 450, 468, 471 (1971); Comment, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.:
Labor Arbitration and Title VII, 119 U. PA. L. Rv. 684 (1971).
34 Text at note 13 supra.
35 428 F.2d 303, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original).
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the right to comprehensive judicial review. Accordingly, the asserted
one-sidedness did not exist. In any case, arbitrator Kahn did not, as we
have seen, purport to deal with statutory questions. To foreclose
Dewey's statutory rights in such a situation would be to deny him the
right to be heard by either an arbitrator or a court and would appear to
be plainly repugnant to due process notions.
It is true that in cases in which statutory and contractual issues over-
lap and the arbitrator resolves an issue common to both proceedings,
unimpeded access to the courts on the basis of Title VII might, as we
will see in a moment, result in the one-sidedness that concerned the
court. But Dewey was not such a case because the resolution of the con-
tractual issue, even if it were conceded to be correct, would not have
affected the statutory claim. Furthermore, even in the overlap situation,
the Sixth Circuit's concern about the death of labor arbitration was
somewhat exaggerated. This is not to deny the legitimate interest of
employers, as well as of unions, in avoiding the burden of successive
arbitral and judicial proceedings. But in an area already replete with
overlapping remedies, arbitration aside, that interest is unlikely to over-
ride the parties' strong mutual interests in preserving a mechanism for
resolving a broad range of disputes that do not impinge on Title VII.
Two Sixth Circuit decisions subsequent to Dewey continue to reflect
a strong commitment to the protection of arbitration and serve also to
illuminate the weaknesses of that decision. First, in Tipler v. E.I.
duPont deNemours & Co.,38 that circuit held that a Title VII action was
not barred by the NLRB's dismissal of a complaint based on the finding
that an aggrieved Negro employee had been dismissed for cause rather
than as a reprisal by a white foreman ousted from a union office after a
racially oriented election campaign led by the discharged employee.
The court distinguished Dewey in part on the ground that relitigation
of the dispute would not undermine the arbitration system.3 7 The court
also relied on the legislative history of Title VIIP8 and on the ground
30 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
ST Id. at 150.
38 Id. at 129. The court relied in part on Sen. Joseph Clark's well-known memorandum
inserted in 110 CONG. Rac. 7207 (1964): "Nothing in Title VII or anywhere else in this
bill affects the rights and obligations under the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act. The
procedures set up in Title VII are the exclusive means of relief against those practices
of discrimination which are forbidden as unlawful employment practices .... Of course,
Title VII is not intended to and does not deny to any individual, rights and remedies
which he may pursue under other Federal and State statutes. If a given action should
violate both Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction. On the other hand, where the pro-
cedures of Title VII are involved, the remedies available are those set out in Section
19711
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that the National Labor Relations Act is aimed at discrimination, that
affects concerted activities while Title VII's proscription operates with-
out regard to the effect of the disputed conduct on such activities. 39
Although that point is incontestable,40 the complaint in Tipler rested
fundamentally on the claim that the discharge had been a result of the
racially oriented election campaign f ..- d ousted the- foremanCon-
sequently, the charge of racial discrimination cognizable under Title
VII coalesced with the charge to the NLRB that dismissal had resulted
from union activities. Indeed, the court seemed to acknowledge this
coalescence when it declared that "[a]llegations of racial motivation
were inherent in the [employee's] complaints to the NLRB" and when
it did not question the contention that "he had twice previously main-
tained.., that his discharge was the product of union activities." 41 That
overlap and the NLRB's resolution of the question common to both
proceedings strengthened the case for preclusion of Title VII remedies
in Tipler. Furthermore, although the charging party is invariably al-
lowed to intervene and participate through his counsel in NLRB pro-
ceedings, 42 this privilege is considerably less certain in arbitration.43
Finally, the NLRB plainly does not suffer from certain institutional
limitations on arbitration that I shall refer to in a moment. All in all,
those considerations appear to make Tipler a much stronger case for
preclusion than Dewey, even though no question of undergirding arbi-
tration arises in the former case. In making that comparative statement,
I do not mean to question the result in Tipler or the court's emphasis
on the different focuses of the NLRA and Title VII, respectively.
In the second post-Dewey case, Spann v. Kaywood Division, Joanna
Western Mills,44 the Sixth Circuit again confronted the problem of
coordinating arbitration and Title VII. Although the court assimilated
707(e) [subsequently renumbered 706(g)], injunctive relief against continued discrimina-
tion, plus appropriate affirmative action including . . . backpay."
39 443 F.2d at 129.
40 It should "be observed, however, that Judge Wright's position in Packinghouse Work-
ers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969), would,
at least with respect to racial discrimination, eliminate this distinction between the two
statutes since Judge Wright postulates that racial discrimination leads to docility among
its victims, which in turn discourages concerted activity. This is not the place to consider
the psychological or legal basis for that position.
41 443 F.2d at 180.
42 29 C.F.R. § 102.29 (1971); T. KAMMHOLZ & K. McGuINass, PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 93 (1962).
43 See Ateson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 BUFFALO
L. REV. 555, 384-85 (1971); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,
Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARv. L. REv. 721, 728-29, 769-72 (1968).
44 446 F.Zd 120 (6th Cir, 1971).
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Dewey and Spann, the two cases were significantly different. Spann,. a
Negro, had written a white woman coworker a note asking her for a
date. Despite a warning by the employer to desist, instigated by the
union president, Spann wrote a similar note to another white coworker.
Spann was immediately fired over the protest of the union vice-presi-
dent, who objected not to the imposition of some penalty but only that
discharge was too severe. Spann's discharge was ultimately the subject
of an arbitration proceeding under a contract that provided: "Equal
pay must be paid for equal work and equal privileges must be granted
regardless of race, creed, or color." The arbitrator, although conceding
that Spann's epistles had caused discontent in the plant, held that dis-
charge had been an excessively severe penalty. He awarded reinstate-
ment to Spann but denied him back pay and stated: "While the race
element was an important factor in the instant series of events, it is pure
conjecture to hold that the same results might not have occurred if the
grievant were white. '45 That statement seemed to be a finding by the
arbitrator that, but for racial considerations, there was at least a sub-
stantial doubt that Spann's conduct would have led to his discharge, and
that, accordingly, racial considerations had been a factor in his dis-
charge. Such a discharge would appear to constitute a violation of
Title VII.46
Spann, although he accepted the reinstatement awarded by the arbi-
trator, was not content with his partial victory. He went to the Mich-
igan Civil Rights Commission, which rejected his complaint on the
ground that "the issue of racial discrimination was taken up and not
proven" and "was decided after a full and fair hearing by an indepen-
dent third party."47 He then went to the EEOC, which rewarded his
persistence with a "reasonable cause" letter, whereupon he filed suit in
a federal district court. That court dismissed on the basis of Dewey,48
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the court emphasized that
Spann had accepted the benefit of the generally favorable award, the
court's limiting summary of its holding did not reflect that emphasis:
"We hold only that where all issues are presented to bona fide arbitra-
tion and no other refuge is sought until that arbitration is totally com-
plete, Dewey precludes judicial cognizance of the complaint. '49 The
court also intimated that Dewey might have been inapplicable had the
45 Id. at 122.
46 Cf. NLRB v. Barberton Plastics Prods. Inc., 354 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1965); Glover V.
Daniel, 318 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
47 446 F.2d 120, 122 (6th Cir. 1971).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 123,
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grievant simultaneously with his resort to the grievance procedure used
"court or agency processes." 50
If we accept the court's statement that the arbitration in Spann had
resolved all issues pertinent to the Title VII claim, an important differ-
ence arises between Spann and Dewey. In Spann, unlike Dewey, the
pertinent contractual provision required the arbitrator to rule on the
contention at the core of Spann's Title VII claim-that race had been a
factor in his discharge. The Sixth Circuit found, moreover, that the
arbitrator had not only ruled on that issue but also that his ruling was
compatible with the statutory standards. The finding of compatibility
is, I have suggested, highly questionable. If, however, we put that diffi-
culty aside, we reach the question that, on the basis of the court's anal-
ysis, was presented by Spann-whether an arbitrator's factual findings
negating racial discrimination and based on standards compatible with
the provisions of Title VII should foreclose an independent judicial
determination of a Title VII claim.
Although I am not in favor of such foreclosure, I want first to men-
tion the weighty considerations that support it when questions perti-
50 Id. at 122-23.
Newman v. Avco Corporation, BNA Daily Lab. Rep. No. 212, Nov. 3, 1971, at DI
(6th Cir. Oct. 27, 1971), handed down after this article was completed, casts doubt on
the continued vitality of Dewey, although these two cases are distinguishable on their
facts. In Newman, the -Sixth Circuit reversed a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, an employer and a union, in an action based on Title VII filed by a Negro
plaintiff whose grievance protesting his discharge as discriminatory had been denied in
arbitration. The court relied on the following grounds for not applying Dewey: First, the
summary judgment deprived the court of an evidentiary record. Second, because of the
exhaustion doctrine (note 59 infra), the plaintiff's recourse to the grievance-arbitration
process was not "voluntary." Third, in the Title VII action (filed after the arbitration
hearing but before the award), the plaintiff had charged that a union-employer con-
spiracy to deprive Negro employees of training had led to the plaintiff's inability to per-
form jobs other than the one from which he had been discharged. Although a lawyer
personally retained by the plaintiff had urged the racial discrimination contention before
the arbitrator, the union's refusal to make that contention had been relied on by the
arbitrator in rejecting it. Those circumstances raised a fundamental question as to the
fairness of the arbitration proceeding. Fourth, the contract did not expressly prohibit
racial discrimination and confined the arbitrator to issues of contractual interpretation
or application. Consequently, there was "grave doubt" that the arbitrator had the right
"to finally decide" the discrimination claims.
Although Dewey did not involve allegations of "conspiracy" and "bad faith," the
second and fourth points referred to above could have also been made in Dewey. Further-
more, the court in Newman emphasized that the plenary jurisdiction of the federal
courts under Title VII could not be curtailed by private agreements and that Dewey had
been based on policies reflected in res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court's empha-
sis on the involuntary nature of an individual grievant's participation in arbitration,
coupled with his lack of control of the proceeding and the institutional deficiencies of
arbitration in this context, raises serious questions as to the applicability of those concepts
as a basis for arbitral foreclosure,
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nent to a Title VII claim have been resolved by an award made in an
arbitral proceeding that was procedurally fair51 and governed by sub-
stantive standards compatible with those embodied in Title VII. Such
foreclosure would presumably avoid social waste, harassment of an
adversary, and manipulation of tribunals. As the doctrines of res judi-
cata and estoppel by judgment make clear, the avoidance of those results
has for a long time been a pervasive objective of our legal system, and
the current overloading of all organs of adjudication make that objec-
tive especially appealing today. Furthermore, in part to achieve that
objective, the NLRB, notwithstanding the plenary authority it is
granted by statute, has adopted a policy of deferring to arbitration,
subject to safeguards built into the Spielberg doctrine.52 Finally, other
circuit courts have indicated that they would consider a similar ap-
proach in the Title VII context, 3 and some law review commentators
have endorsed such deferral.5 4
My rejection of arbitral foreclosure of independent judicial determi-
nation rests primarily on what I consider to be the institutional limita-
tions of arbitration as a remedy for individuals complaining about the
kinds of discrimination proscribed by Title VII-limitations that in-
volve a special risk that the interests of individuals will be submerged
by collective interests. This point about the risk to individual interests
is sensitive, difficult to document, and easy to exaggerate. Nevertheless,
51 For a comprehensive list of such safeguards, see Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 10,
at 651-52 (1971). Some of the safeguards proposed by Messrs. Edwards and Kaplan are
discussed in text and note at note 53 infra.
52 See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955), in which the Board declared
that it would defer to arbitration awards where "the proceedings appear to have been
fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration
panel is not dearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." For a useful
criticism of the Board's doctrine, see Atleson, supra note 43. For a recent review of the
application of the deference doctrine in various contexts and an instance of the Board's
abstention pending arbitration, see Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf & W. Syss. Co., 192
N.R.L.B. No. 150 (Aug. 23, 1971).
53 See, e.g., Spann v. Kaywood Div., Joanna W. Mills, Inc., 446 F.2d 120, 123 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1971) (referring to the safeguards proposed in Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 10, at
651-52, urging that the arbitrator had conformed to those criteria); Hutchings v. United
States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 803, 814 n.10 (5th Cir. 1970). There is, however, reason to
doubt that those criteria were satisfied in Spann. See text and note at note 47 supra; cf.
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1969) (declaring in a different
context that the analogy to labor disputes involving the concurrent jurisdiction of the
NLRB and arbitration was "conclusive').
54 Among those favoring an analogue of Spielberg are Coleman, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Elucidation, 8 DuQuEsoNE L. REV. 1, 24 (1969-70);
Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 10, at 651-52; Developments, supra note 5, at 1227. Contra,
Hebert & Reischell, supra note 88, at 469-71; Peck, supra note 1, at 468; Comment, supra
note 33, at 691-94,
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arbitration is shaped and administered by the union and the employer.
They select and pay the arbitrator, make the record before him, and
sometimes seek clandestinely to supplement it. The arbitrator's future
employment depends on his acceptability to them or to groups shar-
ing their interests, as distinguished from the individual aggrieved by
alleged discrimination. One need not accept Judge Hays's denigra-
tion of the arbitration process55 to recognize that there is some basis for
the fear that economic self-interest and the desire to be loved, which
are linked with future acceptability, may distort adjudication even
when there is complete harmony between the individual's interests and
those of his representatives. The danger of such distortion is obviously
increased when the interests of the individual and the union conflict.
Cases cognizable under Title VII involve special risks of such conflict,
for racial and other forms of proscribed discrimination often persist as
a result of joint action or inertia by unions and management. In such
cases, an arbitrator may, as Professor Blumrosen has put it, be asked to
bite both hands that are feeding him.5 6
Even if one believes that the overwhelming majority of arbitrators
would do their duty in such cases, there is no basis for imputing
such a belief to Congress. On the contrary, the legislative history of
Title VII points in the opposite direction. That history, although far
from conclusive, suggests that overlap between Title VII remedies and
those provided by the NLRA or the Railway Labor Act was not to
affect the applicability of Title VII.57 Arbitral machinery subject to the
Taft-Hartley Act performs substantially the same function as the griev-
ance processes provided for under the RLA and is subject to a similar
risk that the interests of individuals or minority groups in nondiscrim-
inatory employment will be submerged. Accordingly, no basis exists for
giving arbitral remedies a preclusive effect that was apparently to be
denied to remedies provided by the RLA as well as the NLRB.5 8 If,
55 P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW 112 passim (1966).
56 Blumrosen, Labor Arbitration, EEOC Conciliation and Discrimination in Employ-
ment, 24 Am. J. 88, 94 (1969); see Gould, supra note 33, at 44, 46-47.
The Spann case raised some question about the union's commitment to the grievant's
cause, for the union president had been responsible for drawing management's attention
to the first letter and, apparently, for management's warning to the grievant.
57 See Hebert & Reischel, supra note 33, at 460 & n.54 (quoting from Senator Clark's
memorandum, set forth in note 38 supra).
58 Differences in procedures under arbitration and Title VII actions constitute an
additional reason against arbitral foreclosure. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969). For example, there are serious questions regarding the avail-
ability and desirability of formal arbitral discovery. See generally R. SMrrH, L. MERIRwiuFD,
& D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION 217-18 (1970) and
authorities cited therein; Jones, The Accretion of Federal Power in Labor Arbitration-
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however, a court found a violation of Title VII, notwithstanding prior
arbitral determinations that in substance denied such a violation, it
should consider the arbitral determination in fashioning a remedy. For
instance, such an award, if free from procedural unfairness, might well
be a reason for denying back pay for the period between the arbitration
award and the contrary judicial decision-at least where the aggrieved
employee had not objected to resort to the arbitration mechanism.
My proposed rejection of a Spielberg analogue is, I recognize, vulner-
able to several important criticisms. First, it would permit wholesale
relitigation of all arbitral awards because of the possibility that arbi-
tration, like all other forms of earthly adjudication, may occasionally be
imperfect. Second, some safeguard against disloyal or incompetent
union representation is already present in the union's duty of fair rep-
resentation of all members of the bargaining unit. Third, deference to
arbitration could be conditioned not only on safeguards such as those
embodied in the Spielberg doctrine-procedural fairness and substan-
tive standards compatible with Title VII-but also on additional safe-
guards, including an option to the grievant to be represented by his own
counsel in arbitration and an explicit waiver by him of the right to
invoke statutory remedies.
Even though such safeguards would provide a measure of protection
for individual rights, they are not, in my view, sufficient to warrant the
adoption of a Spielberg analogue. Breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion during the grievance-arbitration process is extremely difficult to
prove, and litigation of alleged breaches is likely to be at least as time-
consuming as litigation under Title VII. For several reasons, the
grievant's option to be represented by his own lawyer is of doubtful
effectiveness in the arbitration context. First, a grievant who exercised
that option would in effect be expressing his distrust of union represen-
tatives whose good will might be important in assembling witnesses and
in other aspects of case preparation and for the grievant's continuing
relationships within the plant. Second, the replacement of the union
representative might suggest to the arbitrator that the union was no
more enthusiastic about the merits of the grievance than the employer.
Such signals place intolerable strains on the arbitral machinery and are,
The Example of Arbitral Discovery, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 830 (1968). Furthermore, arbitral
discovery is unlikely to be as effective as the investigative action taken by the EEOC, the
results of which are made available to the aggrieved employee, at least after he has
instituted suit. See H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 956, 964 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27,
1971). In addition, there are manifest differences between the procedural frameworks for
arbitration and judicial actions. See generally Comment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1316, 1322-23
(1970).
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I believe, incompatible with fair adjudication. A grievant's election of
individual representation without knowledge of the foregoing difficul-
ties would scarcely be an informed one. It is, moreover, not easy to
convey an appreciation of those difficulties, and a careful effort to do
so might undermine confidence in a particular arbitrator or in the
arbitration process in general. Third, even if the preceding difficulties
are put aside, arbitration would still be a suspect forum for an indi-
vidual employee, notwithstanding his selection of his own advocate, as
long as the selection of the arbitrator remained in the hands of the
union and the employer.
Let me turn now to an issue that may appear at first glance to be a
digression from our topic but which may fundamentally affect the func-
tioning of the grievance-arbitration process when it overlaps with Title
VII. I am referring to the effect that should be given to a settlement of
Title VII claims worked out during the grievance procedure or, in-
deed, during an arbitration proceeding. Let us assume that the em-
ployee in his individual capacity and the union in its representative
capacity accept such a settlement and that it is conditioned on the
employee's waiver of his overlapping right of action under Title VII,
which is clearly explained to him. Should such a settlement be given
preclusive effect even though such effect is denied to an arbitral award?
The difference between these two situations is, of course, that the set-
tlement has been approved by an individual grievant and is not im-
posed on him by an arbitrator selected by others. To be sure, the
settlement terms may reflect the skill and energy with which the union
prepared and pushed the case. Nevertheless, an employee who had
doubts about the union's commitment could have rejected the settle-
ment. In the absence of evidence of neglect by the union or overreach-
ing by the employer or the union, preclusive effect should, I believe,
be given to such a settlement. This result would, of course, be con-
sistent with the general policy of voluntary adjustment reflected in
the statute.
III
The considerations mentioned earlier in discussing the effect to be
given an arbitration award obviously bear on the third of our questions:
Should the exhaustion of contractual procedures be a prerequisite for
invoking statutory remedies? The case for such a requirement rests on
the following considerations: First, when questions arising under a
collective agreement are involved, the Supreme Court has in general
required such exhaustion before permitting judicial enforcement of
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the agreement. 59 Second, under the Spielberg doctrine, the NLRB has
not only deferred to arbitration awards but also has indicated that the
availability of arbitration might under some circumstances cause it to
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction.60 Third, initial recourse to arbi-
tration would be consistent with the policy, reflected in Title VII, of
promoting conciliation and voluntary adjustments60 and might also
reduce the formidable backlog of the EEOC 62 and the courts. Fourth,
when contractual questions are enmeshed with Title VII claims, courts,
even though not bound by arbitral determinations of such claims, would
have the benefit of the special insight credited to arbitrators with
respect to contractual questions.
Despite these considerations, courts have rejected any exhaustion
requirement in this context. 3 That approach is, I believe, fully justi-
fied. The statute contains elaborate provisions for the exhaustion of
state remedies 4 but is silent with respect to contractual exhaustion,
thereby implying that it was not to be required. Such a requirement
would, moreover, do violence to other parts of the statutory machinery.
Thus, if exhaustion of arbitral remedies were coupled with the Dewey
doctrine of foreclosure, the statutory machinery would be wholly in-
applicable to a significant segment of employment-that covered by
grievance-arbitration procedures. Such a wholesale supersession of statu-
tory remedies would be unwarranted. The employment areas covered
by grievance-arbitration procedures have not been especially immune
from the discrimination proscribed by the statute. Furthermore, those
procedures are, as I have already suggested, subject to special deficiencies
as weapons against such discrimination.
Exhaustion could, of course, be required without giving binding
effect to arbitral awards. But such a requirement would involve delays
in addition to the time periods precisely specified in Title VII for
deferral to state agencies and for EEOC action.65 Furthermore, the
59 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-87 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650 (1965). But cf. Walker v. S. Ry., 385 U.S. 196 (1966).
0 See Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431, 432 (1963), enforced, 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir.
1965); Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf & W. Syss. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (Aug. 23,
1971).
61 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964).
62 See Developments, supra note 5, at 1201-02.
63 See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1969); King v.
Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (ND. Ga. 1968); cf. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 421 F.2d 888, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1970).
64 Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 706(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 20O0-5(b)-(c) (1964).
65 Id. §§ 706(b)-(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e--5(b) to (e).
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legislative history indicates, as we have seen, that the existence of over-
lapping statutory remedies should not affect the applicability of Title
VII remedies. That'history strongly implies that access to these remedies
should not be barred by the existence of contractual remedies, and that
implication is reinforced by the institutional deficiencies of these
remedies as weapons against employment discrimination.
IV
Even though exhaustion is not required, an employee aggrieved by
discrimination may, of course, turn first to the grievance process, the
familiar forum for employee complaints. Such a step, especially if it
leads to arbitration, may take longer than the ninety-day limitation
period for filing a charge with the EEOC. Our fourth question, whether
the limitation period should be tolled while contractual remedies were
being pursued, was raised in Culpepper 'v. Reynolds Metals Co.,66 in
which the Fifth Circuit, reversing the decision below, ruled in favor of
such tolling where the grievance did not go to arbitration. The court
emphasized that statutes of limitation are directed at those who sleep
on their rights and not those who invoke familiar and informal remedies
established by the "rules of the shop."6 7 Furthermore, it suggested that
limitation statutes must be subordinated to the interests of justice and
the purposes of a "humane and remedial Act."6 Finally, the tolling of
the limitation period would, the court urged, encourage initial resort
to the grievance-arbitration process in accord with the policy reflected
in the Steelworkers' Trilogy.69 Accordingly, a grievant who invoked his
contractual remedies should not, the court concluded, be "penalized"
by the destruction of his statutory rights through the running of the
limitations period. Given the fact that many victims of discrimination
are not sophisticated with respect to the availability and suitability of
alternative remedies, the court's result is a desirable one. Here, again,
prior and unsuccessful recourse to the grievance process is a factor to be
considered in connection with judicial awards of back pay for violations
of Title VII.7° Incidentally, it remains to be seen whether the six-month
limitation period embodied in section 10(b) of the NLRA as amended
would also be tolled by resort to the grievance process.
66 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
67 Id. at 892.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 It is fairly arguable that back pay should be denied for the interval between a
dismissal of a grievance and the judicial decision upholding the claim of a Title VII
violation.
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Culpepper suggests another interesting question, the converse of the
one involved in that case. Suppose an employee with a complaint cog-
nizable under both the grievance-arbitration procedure and Title VII
utilizes his statutory remedy and then seeks to invoke the grievance
procedure after the running of the limitation period prescribed in the
contract. Should the running of the contractual period be suspended
for the period in which statutory remedies were invoked? That result
plainly could not be supported as a means of encouraging resort to
arbitration or on the ground that there were special difficulties in uti-
lizing the statutory procedures where racial discrimination was in-
volved. Such a suspension could, however, be defended on two other
grounds invoked in Culpepper. First, the employee had not slept on
his rights and thus had warned the employer of the need to preserve
pertinent evidence. Second, limitation periods should be subordinated
to the requirements of "justice," which might in this context mean pre-
serving all available remedies and giving an employee whose statutory
claim is denied an opportunity to pursue his contractual remedies.
Arbitrators may, however, find these considerations an insufficient basis
for enlarging contractually prescribed limitation periods.
Problems of limitations could be avoided by simultaneous pursuit
of contractual and statutory remedies. But simultaneous actions would
involve waste of scarce social resources and possible harassment of
alleged offenders3 1 In Bower v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 72 a federal
district court sought to avoid such results by requiring plaintiffs who
had invoked their statutory remedies to elect between their statutory
and contractual remedies prior to any decision on the merits in any
forum. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that arbitral and statu-
tory jurisdiction was concurrent.73 It found conclusive the analogy to
labor disputes that are subject to concurrent jurisdiction of arbitrators
and the NLRB. It emphasized that there might be crucial differ-
ences between the processes and the remedies under arbitration and
Title VII. It recognized that an arbitrator might restrict himself to
the contract and ignore the statute but did not expressly discuss situa-
tions in which contractual issues would coincide with or overlap statu-
tory issues. The court announced only one restriction with respect to
71 In view of these costs, the Sixth Circuit's intimation in the Spann case that a griev-
ant might avoid arbitral foreclosure of his statutory remedy if he simultaneously in-
voked both remedies (text at note 50 supra) is questionable. The intimation may reflect
an erroneous assumption that recourse to one of two concurrent remedies necessarily
involves a waiver of the second remedy. See Comment, supra note 33, at 685-89.
72 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
73 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
1971]
50 The University of Chicago Law Review
multiple proceedings-a manifestly sound bar against unjust enrich-
ment through the pyramiding of remedial damage awards. 74
Before concluding, I want to acknowledge that my inquiry suffers
from a serious limitation in that I have concentrated on situations in
which claims cognizable under Title VII have been pressed in more
than one forum. Preoccupation with such cases may have suggested
that interaction between Title VII and arbitration has involved a
substantial amount of social waste and litigious harassment of employ-
ers. That conclusion does not, however, appear to be warranted. On
the contrary, what is striking, in view of the substantial overlap between
arbitration and Title VII,7 5 is the relatively few reported cases in which
arbitration awards have been challenged in Title VII proceedings.7 6
I do not have a firm explanation for that happy circumstance. But
one plausible hypothesis is that arbitrators have, on the whole, done a
good job of finding employment discrimination when it existed or, at
least, of convincing grievants, their lawyers, and the EEOC that claimed
discrimination did not exist or could not be proved. That hypothesis,
if validated, would suggest that arbitrators have risen above the institu-
tional limitations I have emphasized and have by their integrity and
craftsmanship achieved a pleasing kind of finality-finality without
compulsion of law. Perhaps the prospect of an independent judicial
check has contributed to that result by making all participants in
arbitration more sensitive both to the special problems of grievances
that overlap with Title VII and to the importance of the goal of that
Title. In any event, whatever the ultimate fate of the Spielberg analogue
and whatever role is accorded to law in arbitration, the grievance-arbi-
tration process is likely to remain an important weapon against employ-
ment discrimination, and arbitrators are likely to continue to play an
important role in advancing the national goal of equal employment
opportunity.
74 Id. at 715.
75 A Bureau of National Affairs survey indicates that forty-six percent of a sample of
collective bargaining agreements contained clauses barring discrimination on account of
race, creed, or national origin. BuRnAu OF NATIONAL ArF'ags, LABOR RE.LATONS YEARBOOK-
1969, at S4 (1970).
76 For a list of the pertinent cases, see Comment, supra note 58, at 1317 n.10.
